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THE RELATIVITY OF ECONOMIC EVIDENCE IN 
MERGER CASES-EMERGING DECISIONS 
FORCE THE ISSUE 
Betty Bock* 
T HE antitrust laws are based on a set of concepts concerning the relations between economic justice and economic efficiency. In 
the process, they lay out a series of prohibitions on broadly identified 
forms of business behavior, which in some instances are known to 
have-and in other instances may have-substantial anti-competitive 
consequences. Although phrased in terms of individual company 
behavior, the laws are, in fact, primarily addressed to the main-
tenance of an overall economic environment favorable to an opti-
mum output of goods and services at a minimal cost. The laws are 
also designed to provide an appropriate climate for technological 
innovation and economic growth. 
Of more immediate concern, however, than these broad goals, 
are the concepts that lie behind the judgments of the courts 
seeking to give concrete content to the laws. Since the ultimate 
thrust of the statutes is directed toward maintaining and strengthen-
ing competition, there has always been wide latitude for the courts 
to interpret the meaning of competition in different markets. Be-
cause the laws are directed against practices that eliminate com-
petition as well as those that are so excessively competitive that they 
deny other companies an opportunity for survival and growth, they 
may be thought of as aimed at conflicting targets or, if extreme in-
terpretation is avoided, at achieving a median level of competition. 
Such a level cannot, however, be reached by mechanical rules that 
are applied uniformly in all competitive settings. For this reason, 
antitrust analysis, in general, and merger case analysis, in particular, 
require study of the varying effects of varying company behavior in 
varying markets; and this is true regardless of whether the relevant 
analysis is called "legal" or "economic" analysis. 
The following discussion explores the interaction between law and 
economics as these tv,o disciplines relate to the issues which arise 
under section 7 of the Clayton Act,1 as amended in 1950, and exam-
• Dr. Bock is an economist, not an attorney. She is the Manager of the Antitrust 
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1. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958). 
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ines the correlative problems implicit in the working arrangements 
between lawyers and economists when they are asked to counsel an 
enforcement agency or an acquiring or acquired company concerning 
the potential competitive consequences of a merger. 
I. DEVELOPING ECONOMIC CRITERIA FOR MERGER CAsES 
A. The Merger Act as an Economic Instrument 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950, prohibits 
mergers that may substantially lessen competition or tend to create 
a monopoly in any line of commerce in any section of the country. 
The law, therefore, fits smoothly into the intellectual paradoxes that 
envelop our views concerning democracy for the individual, as well 
as democracy for business. Indeed, like our programs for human 
democracy, our programs for competition and monopoly are de-
signed both to foster equality of economic opportunity and to pro-
vide incentives for competitive excellence. At their extremes, these 
two goals are not fully compatible and pursuit of both may lead to 
deep-reaching ambiguities in concrete applications of the law. 
Those who framed the amended merger act did not, it is clear, 
intend absolutely to prohibit mergers. Mergers were thought of as 
instruments for increasing or suppressing competition, depending 
upon a range of facts concerning the merging partners and the mar-
kets affected.2 The new law was, therefore, designed to give the 
courts discretion to judge whether particular mergers raised proba-
bilities of substantial anti-competitive effects. Its language was, how-
ever, so broad that guidelines had to be developed and redeveloped 
as new issues came before the courts. 
The statutory language did make it clear that the law was 
directed at potential as well as actual substantial lessening of 
competition in any market. This has resulted in the development by 
the courts of a sliding, rather than a fixed, set of criteria geared to 
the potential effects of an acquisition upon competitive opportuni-
ties for actual or potential suppliers, competitors, or customers of 
either party to a merger. 
To some extent this has come about through an increasing under-
standing of the variations in different markets; and to some extent 
it has resulted from the oscillating emphasis of the Supreme Court 
on predominantly rule-of-reason or predominantly per se tests, de-
2. Compare A'IT'Y GEN. NAT'L CoMM. ANnmusr REP. 124-25 (1955). 
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pending on the facts before it in particular cases and on its desire to 
seek the rule of law most appropriate to each set of issues. 
B. The Rule of Reason-Per Se Pendulum 
For many years there has been a tendency to distinguish between 
rule-of-reason and per se approaches to the evidence relevant to the 
solution of antitrust problems. The rule-of-reason approach stems 
from a conviction that specific company arrangements may, or may 
not, be harmful to competition and that it is the methods used in 
carrying them out, the settings in which they are practiced, and the 
results that should determine their legal status. By contrast, a per se 
approach suggests that, if there is evidence of a particular form of 
activity such as a price-fixing agreement or an agreement to allocate 
markets, that is, without more, conclusive proof that the law has 
been violated. 
The question of whether a merger act inquiry should be a rule-
of-reason or a per se inquiry arose early in the history of amended 
Clayton 7. The law does not state that mergers per se will lessen 
competition. As interpretations under the act have developed, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has tended to move back and forth between 
a predominantly rule-of-reason approach and a predominantly per se 
approach. 
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States3 the Court adopted a rule-of-
reason approach. Brown was primarily a shoe manufacturer which 
owned and franchised retail outlets, while Kinney was primarily a 
shoe wholesaler and retailer which owned manufacturing facilities. 
The combined percentage of domestic shoe manufacturing ac-
counted for by both companies was as low as 4.5 per cent, while the 
combined percentage of domestic retail shoe sales was even lower. 
In specific local areas, however, Brmvn and Kinney outlets competed, 
and their combined percentages varied from a low of 5.0 per cent of 
children's shoes in Detroit, Michigan, to a high of 57.7 per cent of 
women's shoes in Dodge City, Kansas. 
Facing these facts, the Supreme Court took what at the time 
appeared to be an unusual step, suggesting that the relevant geo-
graphic markets were different at the manufacturing and at the re-
tail level: it held that the market for men's, women's, and children's 
shoes at the manufacturing level was national, while at the retail 
level the appropriate markets were cities of ten thousand or more 
3. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
1358 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 63:1355 
population and their immediately surrounding areas where both 
Brown and Kinney had retail outlets. 
The Court further held that, despite the fact that market shares 
constitute relevant evidence in merger cases and that Brown was 
one of the largest integrated shoe companies in the country and 
Kinney ·was the largest independent, these facts alone were not neces-
sarily sufficient for a conclusion concerning the effects of the acquisi-
tion. The Court noted that formerly distinct manufacturing and 
retailing levels in the shoe industry had been coalescing, as major 
manufacturers acquired chains of outlets, and that normally after 
such a merger other manufacturers sold less to the acquired chains 
and non-integrated retailers bought more from manufacturers who 
were not affiliated with outlets. This trend, said the Court, was 
gradually making it more difficult for non-integrated manufacturers, 
as well as non-integrated retailers, to hold their mm and to deal 
freely with outlets or suppliers who might simultaneously be their 
competitors. 4 
In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,5 the next case before 
it under the amended merger act, the Supreme Court found the 
key facts substantially different. The district court had found that 
the relevant geographic market included the entire Dela-ware River 
Valley area; but, because data for that market were not available, 
the court had examined the effects of the proposed acquisition of 
Girard Trust by Philadelphia Bank in terms of commercial banking 
in the United States as a whole. It found that the merger would 
bring the combined share of the new bank to a point where it would 
rank approximately thirty-sixth among the nation's commercial 
banks and that this was not an alarming position; nor, said the 
district court, did such a share presage a substantial lessening of 
competition of the type that the merger act was designed to prohibit. 6 
The Supreme Court thought othenvise. It held that the relevant 
market was Philadelphia County and three surrounding counties in 
which the majority of the depositors and borrowers of the banks were 
located. Philadelphia Bank had argued that major borrowers had 
found it necessary to utilize New York banks for financing and that 
only a bank as large as would be created by the proposed merger 
could handle this type of business in the Philadelphia area. The 
Supreme Court did not accept this reasoning. It noted that there is 
always a range of potential customers of varying sizes for all under-
4. Id. at 301. 
5. 374 u .. s. 321 (1963). 
6. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348, 366 (E.D. Pa. 1962). 
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takings and that it is not possible to construct an entire spectrum of 
suppliers whose sizes will correspond exactly to the needs of each 
buyer. It went on to find that, within the Philadelphia metropolitan 
area, Philadelphia Bank-Girard Trust would account for over thirty 
per cent of commercial bank loans and deposits and that the four 
largest banks in the area would account for over fifty per cent of such 
transactions. The Court also noted that, since both banks had active 
trust departments, the combined company would account for over 
ninety per cent of such business in the Philadelphia area. Without 
making other factual inquiries, the Court held that the acquisition 
might substantially lessen competition.7 
Thus, Philadelphia Bank and Brown Shoe read together appear 
to teach that the higher the market shares and concentration in the 
relevant market, the less additional economic facts the Court will 
explore in determining whether an acquisition may substantially 
lessen competition. The two decisions also suggest that the Court is 
adopting a mixed per se and rule-of-reason approach to merger case 
problems, with the per se end of the spectrum more evident in Phila-
delphia Bank and the rule of reason end of the spectrum more evi-
dent in Brown Shoe. This in turn means that, following these deci-
sions, the acquiring and acquired company had as great a stake in 
the definition of the relevant market as in a showing that an acquisi-
tion could not have adverse competitive effects. 
In both of these cases, however, there were clear-cut relations 
between the merging partners prior to the acquisitions. Therefore, 
the major thrust of the Supreme Court's analyses went to determin-
ing the boundaries of the relevant markets and the potential effects 
of the realignment of pre-existing company relations. 
In the cases that came before the Court in 1964, by contrast, 
there were no such simple relations between the merging companies. 
At the time El Paso Natural Gas acquired Northwest Pipeline, both 
companies distributed natural gas, but they had no common cus-
tomers. El Paso was licensed by the Federal Power Commission to 
distribute in California, and Northwest Pipeline was licensed to 
distribute in the Rocky Mountain states. However, past negotiations 
between Northwest Pipeline and a major California customer of a 
distributor of El Paso's were sufficient to convince the Court that 
there was potential competition between El Paso and Northwest 
Pipeline and that the merger might substantially lessen such poten-
tial competition. The Court was here, of course, focusing on po-
7. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
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tential geographic competition and was not concerned by the lack 
of past competition in deliveries.8 
A related issue concerning potential product competition arose 
in connection with Continental Can's acquisition of Hazel-Atlas 
Glass. Continental Can had argued that metal cans and glass con-
tainers are manufactured by different industries and sold to different 
customers and that whatever competition exists is inter-industry 
rather than inter-product. Continental Can also argued that the ac-
quisition was intended to permit both partners to diversify, that its 
metal can and glass container divisions were run on a competitive 
basis, and that the acquisition would increase its ability to compete 
with the largest can company and Hazel-Atlas' ability to compete 
with the two largest glass container companies. 
Although the district court agreed with Continental Can, the 
Supreme Court found that there had been actual substitutions by 
users of one type of container for the other: that baby food had, for 
example, been packed primarily in cans in the past and is now 
packed primarily in glass; that beer is packed in both bottles and 
cans; and that Continental Can itself had been a prime mover in 
persuading soft drink manufacturers to shift from bottles to cans 
for packaging carbonated beverages. The Court held that there was 
every possibility of even more competition between metal and glass 
containers in the future and that to permit the second-ranking can 
manufacturer to merge with the third-ranking glass container manu-
facturer, with the new company accounting for approximately 
twenty-nine per cent of the metal-and-glass container market, might 
result in a substantial lessening of competition.9 Although Hazel-
Atlas' contribution to this percentage was small-approximately 3.2 
per cent-the combined share of the two companies ran close to the 
thirty per cent figure deemed dangerous to potential competition in 
Philadelphia Bank. 
With potential geographic and potential product competition 
given definitive weight in El Paso and Continental Can, the Supreme 
Court moved on to the more difficult questions raised by Alcoa's 
acquisition of Rome Cable.10 In that case, there was a clear-cut, but 
limited, vertical relation between the two companies, since Rome 
Cable had purchased aluminum wire from Alcoa in order to make 
aluminum conductor. Rome Cable, however, was primarily a manu-
facturer of copper conductor; at the time of the acquisition, its share 
8. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). 
9. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 461 (1964). 
10. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964). 
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of the aluminum conductor market was 1.3 per cent. But, since 
Alcoa's share was 27.8 per cent, the two together accounted for 29.1 
per cent of the aluminum conductor market-a figure not far from 
the Philadelphia Bank and Continental Can danger limits. Further-
more, as in Brown Shoe, the Court found that the acquisition might 
result in a substantial lessening of potential competitive opportunity 
for independent fabricators. 
With these decisions behind it, the Supreme Court faced the 
more complex issues implicit in the 1960 agreement by Olin 
Mathieson and Pennsalt to establish Penn-Olin as a joint venture 
for the manufacture of sodium chlorate in the Southeast. Prior to 
1960, Pennsalt had been one of three United States companies manu-
facturing sodium chlorate, selling primarily in the West where its 
plant was located. One of its competitors, Hooker Chemical, had a 
plant in the East, while the other, American Potash, had one plant 
in the East and one in the West. Hooker and American Potash to-
gether accounted for ninety per cent of the sodium chlorate sold in 
the southeastern market. 
During the late 1950's, Olin Mathieson and Pennsalt had sep-
arately considered building a sodium chlorate plant in the South-
east, but neither company took active steps in this direction. Olin 
Mathieson did, however, agree to act as agent for Pennsalt in the 
Southeast and its sales there accounted for the remaining ten per 
cent of that market. In 1960, with the southeastern sodium chlorate 
market expanding rapidly, Olin Mathieson and Pennsalt decided 
jointly to set up Penn-Olin, and in 1961, Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
also announced plans to build a plant in the area. 
On these facts, the Supreme Court refused to agree with the 
the district court that the joint venture represented a net increase 
in competition and did not violate the law. The Court took the 
position that if either Olin Mathieson or Pennsalt had gone into the 
market alone while the other remained in the wings as a potential 
competitor, the joint enterprise would have lessened potential com-
petition. The Court accordingly remanded the case to the district 
court with suggestions concerning the factors to be considered in 
making such a detennination.11 
C. The Core Economic Analysis 
The factors bearing on potential competition and the various 
forms in which potential markets may be viewed, therefore, repre-
11. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 878 U.S. 158 (1964). 
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sent the core of the economic analysis required in a merger case 
wherever the competitive consequences of an acquisition are not 
obvious. No one would assert that serious economic analysis would 
be required if the number one company in a clear-cut market were 
to acquire the number two company, if the combined company 
would account for seventy-five per cent of the market, with the next 
ranking company accounting for perhaps twelve per cent. Nor, at 
the other extreme, would anyone assert that extensive economic 
inquiry would be helpful if the 5,332d company in an industry 
acquired the 5,333d. By contrast, however, El Paso, Continental Can, 
Alcoa (Rome), and Penn-Olin all raised issues concerning the 
potentiality of competition, and each required careful study regard-
less of whether it is called "legal" or "economic" analysis, or merely 
"relevant" analysis of potential competition. 
In El Paso, for example, the Supreme Court stated the conditions 
under which a company which has been an unsuccessful bidder for 
a customer's business could still be considered a potential competi-
tor of the company that obtained the business. It held that such a 
determination should be based on: 
• an assessment of the nature and extent of the market and the 
nearness of the absorbed company to it; 
• the eagerness of the absorbed company to enter the market, 
its resourcefulness, and its potential ability to do so; and 
• the growth potential of the market and the potential ability 
of the absorbed company to supply it.12 
The Court further elaborated the criteria for potential competi-
tion in Penn-0 Zin by suggesting that the trial court should take ac-
count of such factors as the following in determining the probability 
that either Olin Mathieson or Pennsalt might have gone into the 
southeastern sodium clorate market alone, while the other remained 
a potential competitor: 
• the number and power of the competitors in the relevant 
market; 
• the background of their growth; 
• the power of the joint _venturers; 
• the relationship of their lines of commerce; 
• the competition existing between them and the power of 
each in dealing with competitors of the other; 
• the setting in which the joint venture was created and the 
reasons for its existence; 
• the line of commerce of the joint venture and its relationship 
to the activities of its parents; 
12. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). 
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• the adaptability of the line of commerce to non-competitive 
practices; and 
• the potential power of the joint venture in the relevant mar-
ket and the effect if one or the other of the joint venturers 
had entered the market alone, instead of through the joint 
venture.13 
Indeed, it is apparent that the Supreme Court is becoming less 
concerned with mechanical lists of existing product or geographic 
market relations between an acquiring and acquired company than 
with answers to questions concerning who may be injured, how, 
where, and how badly. Its decisions are, therefore, increasingly con-
cerned with whether an acquisition may substantially lessen poten-
tial, rather than actual, competition in any market. In the process, 
the Court is adopting a mixed rule-of-reason-per se approach, the 
ultimate consequences of which can become known only as distinc-
tions between different degrees of potentiality are developed in 
future cases. 
D. The Relativity of Economic Criteria 
The Supreme Court's increasing emphasis on potential com-
petition now cuts across previous criteria for determining the bound-
aries of relevant markets and for assessing the competitive factors 
that determine whether an acquisition may substantially lessen 
competition. 
I. Market Boundaries: In Brown Shoe, the Court accepted the 
conventional economic concept of cross-elasticity of demand between 
a product and close substitutes as an appropriate test for determining 
the boundaries of product markets, while advancing a complemen-
tary concept of submarkets whose boundaries are set by such factors 
as industry or public recognition, peculiar characteristics and uses, 
unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sen-
sitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.14 
And, in Philadelphia Bank, the Court ruled that the criteria for 
determining the boundaries of geographic markets and submarkets 
are similiar to those for product markets and submarkets. It held 
that a geographic market is not necessarily identical with the area 
in which the parties to a merger do business or even with the area 
in which they compete; rather, it depends upon "where, within the 
Ill. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., ll78 U.S. 158, 177 (1964). 
14. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). For a detailed con-
sideration of each of these factors, see BocK, 11ERGERS AND MARKE-rs, A GUIDE TO 
EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW 90-111 (3d ed. 1964). 
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area of competitive overlap, the effect of the merger on competition 
will be direct and immediate."15 
In its 1964 decisions, however, the Supreme Court refused to 
apply these criteria whole-cloth, but instead picked and chose among 
them in locating product and geographic areas in which other com-
panies might potentially be affected by an acquisition. Its earlier 
concepts of market boundaries lost their fixed outlines as the Court 
began to view markets in terms of future processes rather than past 
shapes.16 
2. Competitive Effects: Equivalent considerations have bridged 
the Supreme Court's progress from its analysis of competitive con-
sequences in Brown Shoe and Philadelphia Bank to the factors it 
considered in its 1964 decisions. 
In Brown Shoe and Philadelphia Bank the lower the market 
shares and the degree of concentration, the more additional eco-
nomic factors were considered. Taken together, however, these two 
cases focused on considerations concerning the absolute and relative 
size of the acquiring and acquired company, the number of competi-
tors and the degree of concentration, the degree to which the market 
was open to entry, the extent to which formerly separate levels of 
distribution were joined through vertical integration, and the degree 
to which the acquisition might trigger additional acquisitions. 
~~~~~~~M~~~~~~~~ 
as a defense in the next four merger act cases that came before the 
Court. Indeed, the brooding presence of potentiality lies over all 
parts of the Court's analysis in the 1964 cases. As a result, the Court 
dealt repeatedly in probabilities concerning the potential conse-
quences of specific acquisitions for smaller, independent, less well-
financed and otherwise less well-endowed companies than the acquir-
ing-acquired team. 
In practice, this has meant that the present Supreme Court 
majority has refused to be bound in any individual case by all of 
the criteria laid down in previous cases. And this in tum has meant 
that the majority has implicitly, if not explicitly, refused to lay out 
definitive sets of factors that will swing it in one direction or an-
other in determining how the competitive future of third companies 
may be affected by an acquisition. Instead, the majority tends to 
work with kaleidoscopic arrangements of facts concerning competi-
tive structures and processes in particular markets, so that its con-
15. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357 (1963). 
16. BOCK, MERGERS AND MARKETS, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 1964 SUPREME 
COURT MERGER DECISIONS ch. 4 (4th ed. 1965). 
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clusions become a function of the patterns in which it views the 
facts of each case. 
II. THE PLACE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
With competitive history frequently moving faster than it can be 
documented by the companies who are making it, let alone by any-
one from the outside assigned to survey it, and with judicial methods 
bound to facts that may have shifted by the time they are received 
in evidence and assessed by the courts, merger act enforcement im-
plies a basic contrast between the changing processes of the economic 
world and the fixed rules of procedure designed to safeguard the 
rights of defendants and plaintiffs in legal proceedings. 
This means, in effect, that when a major merger is contemplated, 
the officers of the acquiring and acquired company, as well as their 
legal and economic advisers, must explore not only data available 
in company and market records, but must also understand that there 
are likely to be wide areas for which no data exist that are directly 
relevant to an assessment of the effects of the prospective acquisition 
on third companies, including companies that are not at the time 
operating in the markets that may be affected. This type of situation 
is analogous to, but not necessarily identical with, that faced by 
a company planning to introduce new products, to invest in a new 
foreign country, or to develop a new technology. Precisely because 
judgments concerning such questions must be made partly in terms 
of hard facts and partly in terms of probability estimates, they closely 
resemble the judgments required by an acquiring-acquired company, 
by the staff 9f the enforcement agencies, and by the courts in assess-
ing the future consequences of an acquisition. 
While this type of estimate of market potential represents a 
familiar form of analysis for business, it has not been a part of the 
traditions of legal evidence and must, therefore, be built into these 
traditions if the merger act is to continue as a viable method of 
distinguishing between acquisitions that may substantially lessen 
competition and those that may in fact invigorate competition. But 
it is precisely this requirement for probability estimates that gives 
stature to economic analysis in the merger case area. If the appro-
priate facts always stood still and if the appropriate criteria were 
always clear-cut, the research departments of the merging companies 
and the investigatory arms of the enforcement agencies would be 
able to uncover the facts appropriate to merger act conclusions with-
out any assistance from an economist. However, the inherent slip-
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periness of the data, the branching avenues of ignorance, and the 
overriding need for objective judgments concerning the effects of 
an acquisition on rapidly changing markets suggest that economic 
know-how may be of aid to those responsible for merger case deci-
sions at each stage of analysis, from initial estimates of competitive 
risks for third companies to estimates of the viability of alternative 
solutions. 
A. Economic Advocacy v. Neutrality 
Economic assistance, however, is not able to attain unlimited 
results. A doctor, in the end, cannot immunize a patient from 
death, nor can an attorney usually reduce the taxable income of a 
profit-making institution to zero; the trained professional, however, 
in collaboration with his client, can frequently postpone or reduce 
the cost of the inevitable. Equally, economists, in collaboration with 
attorneys, can seek to look the facts in the face and help to work out 
the optimum methods of growth available to clients within the 
competitive ambiguities of the law. 
But the economist's ultimate value will be greatest if he is per-
mitted to function in an independent professional capacity rather 
than as an advocate committed in advance to any given set of con-
clusions. This is so because, with the relative paucity of facts con-
cerning the functioning of markets, the outright advocate-on either 
side of a case-may overlook relevant information regarding how 
competition is carried on in specific settings, what the opportunities 
for innovation and inter-industry competition may be, and how 
competition from foreign industries may deflect the accuracy of 
estimates of the domestic effects of an acquisition. 
Such a stance of relative neutrality is, however, one which many 
commentators consider a "disequilibrium position." Some have, 
for example, suggested that it is no more possible for an economist 
than for anyone else to avoid his mm prejudices and loyalties-that 
no matter how neutral his vocabulary, his preconceptions cannot fail 
to influence his conclusions. If this were the whole truth, there 
would be little to distinguish the professional attorney from the pro-
fessional economist working on a merger case. The attorney might 
spend more time on procedure and precedent, while the economist 
might spend more time gathering and marshalling facts concerning 
the composition of the companies and the markets affected; the 
economist would function simply as a second-line lawyer with spe• 
cialized duties and a specialized commitment-not as an indepen-
dently collaborating professional. 
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The present author would take exception to this view. If an 
economist is trained to explore for facts that aid in determina-
tion of the relevant structure, behavior, and performance of a mar-
ket, he can be of value to either side in an adversary proceeding in 
suggesting whether a particular acquisition is likely to be tested by 
the enforcement agencies and, if tested, what types of facts and argu-
ments are most relevant to the economic conclusions required by 
the law. 
But if the economist is to achieve complementary professional 
status with the attorney who takes ultimate responsibility for a 
case, he must gain his position through continuing study of the sub-
stantive requirements of the law and of the facts concerning how 
competition differs in different markets. Although this is a large 
order, it is the appropriate one for an economist who seeks optimum 
participation in the work of resolving merger case problems. 
B. Economic Ignorance 
The preceding sections of this paper have suggested that an 
economist can make substantial contributions to merger case analysis 
by helping to isolate the elements of risk facing potential partners 
to a merger and by helping to select and verify relevant criteria for 
assessing competitive consequences in changing markets. 
If he can raise relevant questions going to these issues, he can 
participate directly in the merger case process. But, by working in 
this fashion on a difficult merger problem, he reaches a heretical 
position where there is no sharp distinction between economic and 
legal analyses. 
Indeed, whenever a merger decision will hinge on evidence con-
cerning an acquiring and, more particularly, an acquired company's 
past acquisitions, methods of growth, present size, market shares, 
and position in its markets, as well as the size of the markets 
affected, the number of companies, the degree of concentration, the 
nature of vertical integration, and the competitive alternatives open 
to companies who are not affiliated with suppliers or customers, it 
is unclear whether the evidence is economic or legal. In fact, it is 
immaterial what vocabulary is used, provided it is understood that 
both the facts and the conclusions drawn from them must be made 
available within the framework of the requirements of legal evidence 
and must be relevant to the tests implicit in the statute and in the 
relevant decisions of the Supreme Court. 
·whether such constraints may seem too severe to economists who 
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are accustomed to move from aggregative data concerning concentra-
tion or oligopoly directly to conclusions concerning competition does 
not change the issue. If an economist wishes to carry his jargon and 
his hypothesis-making tools into a merger case, he should not be 
surprised if the attorneys with whom he works treat him as a tech-
nician rather than as a professional colleague. Nor should an at-
torney who seeks to use an economist in so limited a way be sur-
prised if the results frequently are not convincing to the courts. 
If, for example, an economist is invited to work up market share 
data after the market has been specified-perhaps as peanuts (if 
someone wants the merger reversed) or perhaps as peanuts, cocktail 
snacks, spreads, jams, and jellies as well as food for terriers and ele-
phants (if someone wants the merger to be sustained)-he may find 
his work carries little conviction, except perhaps for the client who 
may be a peanut or an elephant lover. An economist who relegates 
himself to so purely a technical role will find that the courts tend to 
look elsewhere for their economic theories. 
Services of this kind will, of course, continue to be requested 
as long as our system of law relies on adversary proceedings. It is, 
however, this author's position that such acrobatics do not require 
an economist and certainly do not require sensitivity to the problems 
of competition and economic growth in a constantly changing 
economy. 
The economist who faces his relative ignorance in merger case 
matters and seeks to learn the facts concerning the alternative 
boundaries of the markets that may be affected and the factors 
that may be taken into account in assessing the competitive impact 
of an acquisition must accept the fact that he will be operating with-
out full certainty as to the information that will prove relevant. 
Indeed, information concerning markets, market shares, and con-
centration generally must be supplemented by facts concerning 
whether a market is growing or declining, whether it is in the process 
of shifting its product, geographic, or company composition, and 
whether third companies have opportunities to grow along with the 
acquiring-acquired unit. 
III. JOINT VENTURES IN RISK-TAKING 
A. Communication Between the Economist, 
Businessman, and Lawyer 
The preceding analysis suggests that there are no universally 
applicable rules for establishing a framework for the professional 
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relations between lawyers and economists working in the merger 
case area. It is essential, however, that economists learn how to fit 
into a world of legal rules and legal logic applied to economic facts 
in economic settings. 
On the substantive side, this means that an economist's hypo-
thetical models can be of value only insofar as the assumptions 
built into them can be tested for their relevance in analyzing the 
conditions to which the models are addressed. An economist cannot 
fail to learn in the course of his first merger case that ceteris paribus 
assumptions are as likely to conceal as to reveal the core of a merger 
problem, since it is the fact that "other things do not remain equal" 
that determines the focus of a merger issue. 
The economist's value will be greatest both as an adviser and 
as an expert witness if he considers it his primary responsibility to 
state with care what he knows, the limits of his knowledge, and the 
reservations that must be attached to his conclusions. If he can 
develop such skills and apply them to the critical facts concerning 
the effects of particular mergers in particular markets, he can be-
come a functioning professional in a complex area in which judg-
ments about the future must be drawn from limited, and sometimes 
exasperatingly limiting, facts. 
It should be noted in this connection that the relative poverty 
-of our information about industrial institutions and the relations 
among different company complexes, as well as the sketchiness of 
our understanding of methods of competition in specific industries 
and markets, tend to create serious pressures within the enforcement 
agencies and among companies seeking to grow through the merger 
route. These pressures are almost always first expressed in terms of 
drives toward per se rules-but different per se rules for those with 
different interests. Per se rules that might give comfort and certainty 
to the multi-industry company would be opposed by those concerned 
with equalizing opportunity for medium and smaller companies; sim-
ilarly, per se rules designed to give short-term relief and certainty to 
small, non-integrated companies would be opposed by those who be-
lieve it is essential to avoid undue restrictions on the innovative 
vigor of the larger multi-industry companies. It is precisely because 
of this conflict that the laws have been written in general and, to 
some extent, ambiguous terms. 
For the economist, destined we suspect, to live for many years in 
a world of shifting competitive facts, the most significant role is also 
the one least likely to allow him to build up a vested line of factual 
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information. Because the merger act focuses on who may be injured, 
and how, and where, these questions must be explored concurrently 
by the enforcement agencies and by the companies seeking to go 
forward with major merger activities. An economist will, therefore, 
attain his greatest value in merger case work if he is experienced in 
obtaining relevant market facts and evaluating them in conjunction 
with attorneys whose skills and judgment are directed to the same 
data concerning the same markets. 
It should also be noted that in most merger cases, officers of the 
company in question and industry members will have a more com-
plete working knowledge of the facts than will staff members of an 
enforcement agency. This will normally work toward fluctuations 
in fact-finding methods and in case selection programs as agency 
staff members seek to overcome their own ignorance and to arrive 
at equitable conclusions as to what mergers should be attacked. 
Facing this unavoidable disparity in knowledge between at-
torneys and economists and between industry members and mem-
bers of enforcement staffs, the law schools can further mutual un-
derstanding by training students of trade regulation in methods of 
evaluating economic data, in assessing what the strengths and short-
comings of such data may be, and in determining how closely pub-
lished statistics may correspond to the market situations to which 
their classifications relate. Equally precise training in the types of 
facts going into the major merger cases would benefit economists 
who plan to work with attorneys on such cases. Economists should 
have studied not merely textbook summaries of cases, but the texts 
of J:iigher and lower court decisions as well as full trial records 
wherever possible. This type of training can go a long way toward 
furthering mut"!lal professional trust and respect b~tween antitrust 
attorneys and economists-be they policy-makers, explorers of com-
petitive potential, or advocates in specific cases. 
B. The .Economist's Value 
It follows that the present author believes that the role of an 
"economic expert" in a merger case is a modest one. Although a 
chemist may state with absolute certainty whether a fabric is flam-
mable, merger questions are rarely so easily resolved, since almost 
every merger will increase competition in some ways, decrease it 
in others, and leave open questions along many lines. The merger 
expert's expertise should, therefore, rest on a sensitively balanced 
inquiry into who may be affected, how, and how badly. Indeed, the 
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value of the economist will increase in proportion to his ability to 
articulate the exact degree of risk to competition and the exact 
balance of certainty attached to his assessment of this risk. In the 
process of preparing himself for such a role, an economist should, 
I think, learn as much as he can about the markets affected and how 
they operate. He should know the record and he should know as 
much as possible about the opportunities for competitive vitality 
for third companies not directly engaged in the merger. 
Thus the value of an economist in a merger case setting in-
creases in direct proportion to his ability to assimilate and compare 
complex bodies of facts, the precision with which he can marshal 
these facts, and the balance he can bring to his judgment concerning 
their meaning for competition. It follows also that collaboration be-
tween a lawyer and an economist should not be a mechanical one 
with the difference between the two skills viewed as sharply dis-
tinct; nor should it be a master-and-servant relationship which makes 
the economist a specialized law clerk or a highly specialized pleader. 
The relationship should, rather, be viewed as one of continuing 
mutual education in overcoming ignorance about what are essen-
tially complex problems in estimating potential competition. 
Such collaboration requires not only verbal but bone-deep under-
standing that neither legal nor economic problems in the merger 
case area come pure. Issues are unavoidably mixed, and the costs of 
overcoming ignorance in different factual settings are high. Joint 
aid in determining how to marshal existing facts and how to collect 
new bodies of evidence at appropriate costs presents one of the most 
fruitful fields for collaboration. 
The economist's most responsible, and in the end most chal-
lenging, role can evolve only if he works from facts, through criteria, 
to conclusions based on experience concerning the delicate balance 
of equity involved in evaluating the effects of specific company 
activities on existing and potential competition. In the process we, 
as economists, may as well acknowledge openly that the emperor's 
clothes are not always imperial; the law has in many cases proved 
a blunt instrument in preserving and strengthening competition, 
and economic analysis is not always competent to prevent errors in 
judgment concerning the regulation of competition or to administer 
therapy when a company, or a group of companies, is found to be 
reducing competitive opportunity for third companies. The work 
of the economist, like that of the lawyer, should, however, be 
directed toward finding appropriate methods of preventive therapy 
that will maximize opportunities for competition and growth. 
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The present article is, then, a brief for a theory that responsible 
analysis of the effects of a merger upon potential competition re-
quires that economists take joint responsibility with attorneys for 
developing economic facts and economic criteria that can reach the 
dignity of legal evidence and form the basis for legal conclusions. 
Such collaboration requires that the economist train himself to aid 
in developing methods of collecting data and in reaching estimates 
of potential competitive consequences shaped to meet the procedural 
requirements implicit in judicial tests of the admissibility, weight, 
and probative value of legal evidence. 
